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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years the landscape of the American judi-
cial system has undergone a perceptible change in response to in-
creased popular and academic dissatisfaction' with the magnitude,
cost and delay associated with litigating routine' civil cases. A num-
ber of different innovations, aimed at making the resolution of ordi-
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1. "Dissatisfaction with the trial courts appears well justified. In some of our major
metropolitan areas, where most litigation is pending, a civil case frequently takes five years or
more to get to a jury trial. In only a few courts do cases move routinely to trial within a year."
ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, Attacking Litigation Costs and
Delay: Final Report 7 (1984). See also Trotter & Cooper, State Trial Court Delay: Efforts at
Reform, 31 Am. U.L. REV. 213 (1983); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274,
276 (1982); Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964); Janofsky, Reducing Court
Costs and Delay: An Overview, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 467 (1983); Connolly & Smith, The
Litigant's Perspective on Delay: Waiting for the Dough, 8 JusT. Svs. J. 271, 285 (1983).
2. A recent study found that the median stakes for civil cases in federal court are
$15,000. D. TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELSTINER, H. KRITZER & A. SARAT, CIVIL LITI-
GATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT II 53-56 (1983). See also Trubek, Sarat, Fel-
stiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 73, 84-85
(1983).
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nary civil cases less complex, time-consuming, and costly, are respon-
sible for this change.
Court-annexed arbitration8 is one innovation that has achieved
recent popularity4 as a method for the reduction of litigation cost and
delay. The increased interest in court-annexed arbitration flows from
two unrelated, but complementary, responses to the problems of de-
lay and cost. These responses are represented by the efforts of court
administrators to streamline the litigation process and the efforts of
those who question the appropriateness of traditional litigation
processes for the resolution of every type of case. The fundamental
premise of court-annexed arbitration accepts the adversary process as
a means of resolving disputes, but attempts to simplify and expedite
the process without changing or challenging its essential character.
The principal aims of case management systems are to reduce
case backlogs and expedite the processing of cases on the docket'
without adding judicial personnel-in other words, efficiency. Draw-
ing upon the common wisdom that inertia is a powerful force and
that individuals often will not act on a given problem until forced to
do so by the pendency of an approaching deadline, case management
3. The name "court-annexed arbitration" is misleading because it suggests that the pro-
cess is similar to traditional consensual arbitration. It is not similar; court-annexed arbitration
is much closer to adjudication than to traditional arbitration.
Unlike commercial arbitration, court-annexed arbitration is mandatory, and cases which
fit the jurisdictional requirements of a court-annexed arbitration program are referred to arbi-
tration regardless of the wishes of the parties. The arbitrators in court-annexed arbitration
programs are often selected by a third party, usually an employee of the court, rather than the
parties themselves. Moreover, the hearings in cases subject to court-annexed arbitration are
open to the public, unlike the generally private hearings in traditional arbitration. The greatest
difference between the two is that in court-annexed arbitration the arbitrator's award is not
binding on the parties. See generally Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitratioi, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 537, 537-38 (1983). See also, Simoni, Court-Annexed Arbitration in Oregon: One Step
Forward and Two Steps Back, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 237 (1986) [hereinafter Simonil.
4. Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt court-annexed arbitration. The history of
Pennsylvania's court-annexed arbitration legislation is described in Doty, Philadelphia's Com-
pulsory Arbitration Program, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1449, 1449-53 (1984).
The states with court-annexed arbitration programs authorized by statute or court rule
are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.190 (1983); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133
(Supp. 1987); California, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10-1141.32 (Deering Supp. 1988);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-549n-aa (West Supp. 1988); Delaware, DEL.
SUPER. CT. Civ. R. § 16(c) (Supp. 1986); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 601 (Supp. 1987);
Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-1001A-1006A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.73 (West Supp. 1988); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.215-38.255
(1987); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6a-24 -39:6a-25 (West Supp. 1987); New York,
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-37 (1986); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 33.360 (Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7361, 7362 (Purdon 1987); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
7.06.010-7.06.910 (West Supp. 1987).
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theory stresses the development and implementation of strong, cen-
trally controlled case management systems. These systems are char-
acterized by the short-scheduling of events in the case as well as the
imposition of judicial deadlines to which attorneys and court person-
nel must adhere.' The presence of these deadlines forces attorneys to
give early and continuing attention to cases, and prevents attorneys
from placing certain cases on a lower level of priority, where they
may languish from inattention.
The second impetus for court-annexed arbitration derives from
the work of those who seek the related goals of developing and im-
plementing "appropriate" 6 dispute resolution techniques, and of re-
ducing litigation cost and delay. These dual goals8 have been viewed
5. Smith & Connolly, Achieving and Maintaining Currency: A First-year Examination
of Vermont's Trial Court Program, in A.B.A. ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT
COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: PROJECT REPORTS AND
RESEARCH FINDINGS 42, 43 (1984) [hereinafter PROJECT REPORTS]; T. CHURCH, JR., A.
CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN
TRIAL COURTS (1978); L. SIPs, A. CARLSON, T. TAN, A. AIKEN & R. PAGE, MANAGING
TO REDUCE DELAY (1980).
The case management style of court administrators differs dramatically in its control over
the criminal docket and over the civil docket. Court administrators traditionally exercise con-
siderable control over the pace of criminal trials, monitoring the cases at each step in the
judicial process. PROJECT REPORTS, supra note 5, at 39. In contrast, court administrators tend
to leave concerns involving the pace of civil litigation to attorneys. PROJECT REPORTS, supra
note 5, at 39.
A number of innovative case management systems demonstrate that the pace of civil liti-
gation can be increased through a strong centralized system. A case management program
implemented in two Kentucky circuit courts succeeded in reducing the average length of me-
dium sized civil cases from sixteen to five months. Connolly & Planet, Controlling the
Caseflow-Kentucky Style, 21 JUDGES' J., Fall, 1982, at 8, 54. The hallmarks of the Ken-
tucky case management program are judicial control of the progress of a case, short scheduling
of events, a reasonable accommodation of the attorneys' needs, and a policy of firm trial dates
and limited continuances. Id. at 56-57. Successful court-annexed arbitration programs use sim-
ilar case management techniques. See generally Simoni, supra note 3, at 243 n.27. See also
Friesen, Cures for Court Congestion, JuDGES' J., Winter, 1982, at 7.
For an additional study documenting similar results in courts with strong case manage-
ment programs, see Connolly & Smith, supra note 1, at 274-82 (a survey of litigation delay
patterns in the Vermont Superior Court).
6. The phrase "appropriate" dispute resolution technique is not self-defining. An "ap-
propriate" dispute resolution technique is one that is responsive to the needs of litigants and
adapted to the particularities of the dispute. Examples of efforts to introduce the use of "ap-
propriate" dispute resolution techniques can be found in the use of mediation in child custody
disputes. See infra note 8, at 903-04.
7. See Alfini, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts: An Introduction, 69 Ju-
DICATURE 252 (1986) [hereinafter Alfini].
8. Other alternative dispute resolution "methods include mediation, negotiation, mini-
trials, summary jury trials, consensual arbitration, and final offer arbitration." They represent
true "alternatives" to the litigation paradigm in that they stand in place of litigation. These
alternatives are beyond the scope of this article. Walker, Court-Annexed Arbitration Comes to
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by some as a major judicial reform' and by others as a means to save
litigants time and money while delivering higher quality justice.1"
While not a true "alternative" dispute resolution mechanism, court-
annexed arbitration can reduce litigation cost and delay for the ordi-
nary civil lawsuit and provide litigants with an "appropriate" dis-
pute resolution mechanism.
Court-annexed arbitration programs seek to achieve several re-
lated goals: (1) reduced congestion of civil dockets with a correspond-
ing decrease in associated court costs; (2) reduced time necessary to
dispose of cases and their concomitant costs; and (3) improved court
access to litigants.1 The effectiveness of court-annexed arbitration
programs in meeting these goals has not yet been measured compre-
hensively. 2 However, the data that exist indicate that the effective-
ness of court-annexed arbitration depends in large part on the qual-
ity of two ingredients critical to each program: the structure and
process of each program as defined by the enabling legislation and
other applicable rules, and the behavior of participating arbitrators,
attorneys, and litigants."
II. COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAMS
Although the details of court-annexed arbitration programs
vary, most successful programs share certain structural and opera-
tional similarities.1 4 First, the programs divert certain classes of
cases1 to mandatory non-binding arbitration as a precondition to
trial. Second, the cases are heard by an arbitrator, oftentimes an at-
torney selected by the parties or by court personnel, rather than a
judge. Third, the programs set strict time lines for the arbitration
hearing. Fourth, the programs give the arbitrators many of the same
powers exercised by judges: the arbitrator conducts the hearing, rules
on evidentiary matters, and issues a decision and award that becomes
North Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901, 903 (1986).
9. Alfini, supra note 7, at 252.
10. Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court Administered Arbitration,
69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986).
11. Id. at 272.
12. Id.
13. Walker, supra note 8, at 942-43; See also Hensler, supra note 10, at 272-76.
14. For a parallel discussion of the similarities among court-annexed arbitration, see
Simoni, supra note 3, at 247-48.
15. Generally, the only cases assigned to arbitration are those in which the only relief
sought is money damages or those domestic relations cases in which the only issue in dispute is
the division or distribution of property between the parties. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 33.360
(1987). See Simoni, supra note 3, at 248 n.43.
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the judgment of the court if none of the parties request a trial de
novo. Fifth, the programs provide parties dissatisfied with the arbi-
tration award the right to a trial de novo before a judge. If a trial is
held, the matter proceeds as if there had been neither an arbitration
hearing nor an arbitration award." Finally, arbitration programs at-
tempt to reduce the number of frivolous appeals by establishing dis-
incentives for parties who appeal the arbitration award." The disin-
centives may be in the form of filing fees, required to perfect the
appeal as well as monetary penalties if the party appealing the
award does not improve her position at the subsequent trial de
novo.' Under certain circumstances, a portion of the non-appealing
party's attorney fees1" may be imposed upon the appealing party if
the latter does not improve her position at the trial de novo.
A. Effect of Court-Annexed Arbitration on Litigation Delay20
Successful court-annexed arbitration programs can reduce liti-
gation delay for the cases referred to arbitration as well as for the
cases that are not subject to arbitration. Because arbitration provides
a simplified adjudicative forum, cases subject to court-annexed arbi-
tration are generally resolved sooner than they would have been had
they not been submitted to arbitration. Many arbitration programs
divert cases to the arbitration track at an early point in a case's life
and provide for shortened periods of discovery, 2 a limitation on
16. Oregon's arbitration statute provides that the parties can "appeal" the arbitrator's
decision by requesting a trial de novo. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.400(2)(a) (1987). The word
"appeal" is misleading because the trial court is not asked to review the decision of the arbitra-
tor and correct it for error. In fact, although the trial court will generally know that there has
been an arbitration hearing and an award, the court will not know what the award was nor
which party sought trial de novo. MULTNOMAH COUNTY ARBITRATION RULE 14.25. See
Simoni, supra note 3, at 248 n.46.
17. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.400 (1987). For a parallel discussion of the disincentives to
frivolous appeals in the arbitration setting, see Simoni, supra note 3, at 248-49.
18. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.400(2)(c) & (d) (1987).
19. Shuart, Smith & Planet, Settling Cases in Detroit: An Examination of Detroit's
Mediation Program, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 307, 316-17 (1983) [hereinafter Shuart]. Although its
proponents describe Detroit's program as a "mediation" program, it more closely resembles
court-annexed arbitration programs.
20. For a parallel discussion of the effects on litigation delay imposed by arbitration, see
Simoni, supra note 3, at 249-52.
21. Not all arbitration programs refer cases to arbitration as soon as all of the parties
have appeared. Michigans Wayne County program does not refer cases to a hearing until
discovery has been completed. The hearing does not take place until the 27th month after the
complaint has been filed. Discovery is completed by the time of the hearing. Shuart, supra
note 19, at 310-11 n.5.
1988]
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some types of discovery, 2 and an expedited hearing process. The
"fast-tracking" 24 of the arbitration cases reduces the possibility of
excessive delay.
The expedited discovery and hearing procedures encourage ear-
lier settlements in cases likely to settle because the attorneys must
prepare and evaluate their cases sooner than would have been neces-
sary had the case remained on the litigation track.25 If the parties do
not settle, but proceed to the arbitration hearing and accept the arbi-
trator's award, the case is still resolved sooner than it would have
had it gone to trial, because arbitration hearings are generally con-
vened more quickly than a trial. Even if the parties reject the arbi-
tration award and request a trial de novo, the arbitration award may
stimulate settlement before trial because it provides the parties with
a neutral evaluation of the value of their case.26
Court-annexed arbitration programs can also benefit cases
outside the arbitration programs. Because court-annexed arbitration
diverts certain types of cases from the litigation track,2 7 the total
22. See, e.g., MULTNOMAH COUNTY ARBITRATION RULE 14.14 (the arbitrator has the
power to restrict discovery).
23. Although the restrictions on discovery and the expedited hearing process may raise
concerns about the quality of justice dispensed by court-annexed arbitration programs, one
should keep in mind that court-annexed arbitration is intended to handle the relatively routine
case that does not present either legally or factually complex matters for decision. Our survey
of attorneys found that discovery is not extensive in the large majority of cases subject to
arbitration. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
24. The "fast-tracking" aspect of court-annexed arbitration is a direct descendent of the
various types of strong case-management programs that are enjoying an increasing popularity
with court administrators. See supra note 5.
25. [T~he predominance of settlement as a means of case disposition does not
mean that settlement occurs shortly after filing; many cases last for a year or
more before they are settled. It is reasonable to suppose that many settlements
occur when, and only when, the attorneys in the case find it necessary to turn
their attention to the case, prepare the evidence, and assess the case's strengths,
weaknesses, and net monetary value. Trial is rarely an economically desirable
method of case disposition, because it normally results in greater expense for all
involved than would a settlement .... A prompt time schedule for the arbitra-
tion hearing provides a motivation for counsel to prepare their cases promptly,
and the expense of attorney time spent in the arbitration hearing may motivate
settlement in advance of the hearing.
E.A. LIND & J.E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 9-10 (rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter LIND & SHAPARD].
26. If the parties do not settle before trial de novo, they will not have been delayed in
getting to trial. Most arbitration programs specify that cases returning to litigation for a trial
de novo, retain their original position on the civil trial docket. See, e.g., MULTNOMAH
COUNTY ARBITRATION RULE 14.27. The practice in Lane County is to set a trial date at the
same time a case is transferred to arbitration. Conversation with Norman Meyer, Lane
County Trial Court Administrator. See Simoni, stipra note 3, at 250 n.56.
27. The number of cases referred to arbitration will depend upon the jurisdictional
[Vol. 28
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number of cases on the civil docket decreases. The cases remaining
on the docket become part of a shorter queue of cases and there is a
reduction in case backlog, although the number of court personnel
has not increased. The beneficial effect of court-annexed arbitration
is inversely related to the number of cases originally submitted to
arbitration which return to the litigation track after the arbitration
award is rejected. If a large percentage of the arbitration cases rou-
tinely accept the arbitration award and do not return to the litigation
track, case backlog will be significantly reduced.
B. Court-Annexed Arbitration in Oregon
In 1983, the Oregon Commission on the Judicial Branch pro-
posed a series of legislative bills designed to reduce excessive litiga-
tion delay and cost. 8 One of the bills authorized district and circuit
courts to create and implement court-annexed arbitration pro-
grams.2" The Commission stated that of the several litigation delay
proposals it introduced, it believed "the one which may affect the
greatest number of cases and provide the greatest savings is the au-
thorization of local arbitration programs for ordinary civil cases."80
The Oregon Legislature subsequently passed the legislation81 au-
thorizing court-annexed arbitration in district and circuit courts. The
statute set the jurisdictional ceiling for civil cases subject to arbitra-
tion at $15,000 in circuit court and $3,000 in district court and au-
thorized arbitration for certain types of domestic relations cases. 2 In
1987, the Legislature increased the jurisdictional level for arbitration
threshold and ceiling of the arbitration program. A program with a low jurisdictional ceiling
will divert a smaller percentage of cases to, arbitration than will a program with a higher
jurisdictional ceiling. The jurisdictional ceilings for most arbitration programs range from
$15,000 to $40,000. A number of federal district courts have $100,000 jurisdictional ceilings.
P. EBNER & D. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL PICTURE
8-10 (1985). Michigan's Wayne County, program is unique because it has a $10,000 jurisdic-
tional floor, but no jurisdictional ceiling. Shuart, supra note 19, at 310 n.5. See Simoni, supra
note 3, at 249 n.50.
28. For the legislative background of Oregon's adoption of a court-annexed arbitration
program, see Simoni, supra note 3, at 252-59.
29. 1982 REPORT OF THE OREGON COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 5-51
(1983) [hereinafter 1982 REPORT]. Oregon's first court-annexed arbitration program was a
pilot program adopted by local rule in Multnomah County Circuit Court in 1982. See Mult-
nomah County's Pilot Arbitration Program-A Model for the State of Oregon, OR. ST. BAR
BULL. 30 (Jan. 1985). For a more complete discussion of the legislative background of Ore-
gon's court-annexed arbitration program, see Simoni, supra note 3.
30. 1982 REPORT, supra note 29, at 8.
31. H.B. 2369, 62 Leg., 1983 Or. Laws 1262.
32. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.360(1) (1985).
19881
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in circuit court to $25,000 and $10,000 in district court. 8 The juris-
dictional requirements relating to domestic relations cases remained
unchanged.
Two characteristics mark Oregon's arbitration statute.3 ' First,
the statute is permissive rather than mandatory. It authorizes judicial
districts to adopt court-annexed arbitration programs, but does not
require them to do so." Second, the statute establishes only the
broad outline for court-annexed arbitration programs. It delegates
responsibility for the development of operational rules to the judicial
districts adopting such arbitration programs."' The statute gives the
courts a great deal of latitude in developing their rules: the arbitra-
tion rules need only be consistent with the enabling legislation8 and
receive approval from the Chief Justice."'
The statute establishes jurisdictional limits for arbitration:.. it
provides that participating courts shall refer to arbitration those civil
cases in which the only relief claimed "is recovery of money or dam-
ages, and no party asserts a claim for money or general and special
damages"' greater than $10,000 in district court or $25,000 in cir-
cuit court,'41 and those domestic relations cases in which "the only
contested issue is the division or other disposition of property be-
tween the parties.'4 The statute also permits litigants to opt into
33. H.B. 2091, 64 Leg., 1987 Or. Laws 198, increased the jurisdictional ceiling for
court-annexed arbitration in circuit court from $15,000 to $25,000. H.B. 2092, 64 Leg., 1987
Or. Laws 192, increased the jurisdictional ceiling for court-annexed arbitration in district court
from $3,000 to $10,000. The bills passed both houses of the Oregon Legislature without a
dissenting vote.
34. For a complete discussion of Oregon's arbitration provisions, see Simoni, supra note
3, at 259-77.
35. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.350(1)(a) & (b) (1987).
36. Id. § 33.350(2).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The arbitration statute permits parties who assert "a claim for money or general
and special damages in an amount exceeding $25,000" to waive the amount in excess of
$25,000 and have the claim assigned to arbitration. Id. § 33.380. The decision to waive the
amount in excess of $25,000 and proceed to arbitration is the sole decision of the party assert-
ing the claim. In such cases, the waiver of the amount in excess of the $25,000 jurisdictional
limit is for purposes of the arbitration hearing only; if the party waiving the amount in excess
of the $25,000 is dissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision and award, that party may assert
the entire original claim in a trial de novo. Id.
40. Id. § 33.360(1)(a).
41. The statutory limits are "exclusive of attorney's fees, costs and disbursements and
interest on judgment." Id.
The Commentary to the proposed legislation states that punitive damages are not to be
considered in determining the amount of damages sought. 1982 REPORT, supra note 29, at 8.
42. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.360(1)(b) (1987). Despite the mandatory language that courts
with arbitration programs "shall" refer eligible domestic relations cases to arbitration, the
[Vol. 28
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arbitration even though their cases may not meet the statute's juris-
dictional requirements. Conversely, the statute also permits presiding
judges of participating courts to exempt qualifying cases from arbi-
tration if good cause exists to do so."'
The fundamental structural guidelines of the arbitration pro-
grams are also set by statute. The statute provides that cases will be
heard by one arbitrator,44 and places responsibility for compensating
this individual with the parties to the dispute.4" The compensation
requirement ensures that the arbitration program is directly funded
by the parties who use it. The compensation costs will not increase
the total cost of litigation if, as anticipated, arbitration expedites the
process and reduces other costs associated with litigation."
The arbitrators' powers are largely defined by statute. The stat-
ute gives the arbitrators the authority to conduct a hearing and make
a "decision and award"47 that becomes the judgment of the court if
not appealed within 20 days after the date the decision and award
are filed by the arbitrator.48
The statute permits parties against whom "relief is granted by
the [arbitrator's] decision and award or a party whose claim for re-
lief was greater than the relief granted' ' 9 to file a written notice of
appeal and a request for a trial de novo." Although the statute guar-
Linn-Benton program exempts domestic relations -cases from arbitration.
43. Id. § 33.360(2). The flexibility inherent in this rule is necessary if court-annexed
arbitration is to meet its goal of expediting cases without diminishing either the apparent or
actual justice provided. Although the ordinary civil case is neither factually nor legally difficult,
see infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text, a case involving small stakes can raise signifi-
cant legal and policy questions. Such a case is inappropriate for arbitration because of the
likelihood that the parties will appeal the arbitration award and request a trial de novo. If it is
apparent that a case will be tried irrespective of the presence of mandatory arbitration, the case
should be exempted from the arbitration process. See Simoni, supra note 3, at 260 n.109.
44. Although the statute does not expressly state that a single arbitrator is to be used, it
consistently uses the single form of the word "arbitrator." See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §
33.390(1) (1987): "At least five days before the date set for an arbitration hearing, the arbitra-
tor shall notify the clerk of the court of the time and place of the hearing." (emphasis added).
45. Id. § 33.390(3).
46. See infra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
47. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.400(1) (1987).
48. Id. § 33.400(3). The specific limitations on the arbitrators' powers are described by
local arbitration rule.
49. Id. § 33.400(3).
50. The Oregon Constitution guarantees litigants the right to jury trial in civil actions.
Article I, section 17 provides that "[iun all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain
inviolate." OR. CONST. art. I, § 17. This provision is limited by art. VII, section 3, which
provides that "[i]n all actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $200, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Id. § 3.
For a parallel discussion of the appeal provisions, see Simoni, supra note 3, at 263-64.
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antees the parties' right to a trial de novo, it establishes two distinct
sets of financial disincentives regarding the right to appeal."' First,
the party filing a notice of appeal and request for a trial de novo
must deposit $150 with the clerk of the court."' The deposit is re-
funded if the party filing the notice of appeal improves her position
in the subsequent trial de novo;" it is forfeited if she does not im-
prove her position in the trial de novo." The second financial disin-
centive can be more onerous. The statute bars a party who files the
notice of appeal and fails to improve her position in the subsequent
trial de novo from recovering either an award of attorney's fees or
costs and disbursements to which she would otherwise be entitled."
Moreover, the statute makes this person liable for the costs and dis-
bursements incurred by the opposing party in the trial de novo."
III. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL SURVEY
A. Purpose of the Survey
We conducted a survey to assess the attitudes of litigants and
attorneys in cases subject to court-annexed arbitration. Specifically,
we sought to determine whether the participant's evaluations of
court-annexed arbitration validated the theoretical assumptions that
underlie court-annexed arbitration.5
7
Critics of court-annexed arbitration have sometimes argued that
the process establishes a system of second class justice for subject
51. The reasons for the disincentives are obvious: court-ordered arbitration will succeed
in reducing backlog and delay only if a substantial proportion of the cases diverted to arbitra-
tion do not return to litigation. If a substantial proportion of the cases diverted to arbitration
return to the litigation track, court-ordered arbitration will have done nothing to decrease liti-
gation delay. In fact, diverting cases to arbitration may succeed only in increasing litigation
delay and cost by inserting an additional procedural obstacle that the parties must surmount
before proceeding to trial. See Simoni, supra note 3, at 263-64 n.128.
52. OR. REV. STAT. § 33.400(2)(c) (1987).
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id. § 33.400(2)(d). A party who prevails in the arbitration hearing is entitled to
costs and disbursements under OR. R. Civ. PRO. § 68(B) (1987). If the prevailing party files a
notice of appeal and a request for a trial de novo, and receives a judgment equal to or less than
the award she received from the arbitrator, the party has failed to improve her position at the
trial de novo and forfeits the right to costs and disbursements under OR. R. Civ. PRO. § 68(B)
(1987) even though she remains the prevailing party.
56. Id. § 33.400(2)(d).
57. Although neither the arbitration statute nor the arbitration rules explicitly state as
much, the purpose of the arbitration process is to produce a result that approximates what a
litigant could reasonably expect to receive at trial. This conclusion is implied in the arbitration
statute's grant of the automatic right to request a trial de novo for any reason. Id. §
33.400(2)(a).
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cases."' This criticism is directed both at the quality of the decisions
reached by arbitrators and at the possible reduction in procedural
protections available to the litigants in such an expedited and infor-
mal hearing process. Closely tied to this criticism is the concern that
any potential savings in time and expense realized by court-annexed
arbitration in theory will be illusory if the litigants routinely reject
the arbitration award and proceed to trial de novo because they are
dissatisfied with their awards.
The results of our survey indicate that a large majority of par-
ticipants believe court-annexed arbitration produces acceptable
awards, and that it reduces the time and cost of case disposition for
the bulk of cases subject to the arbitration rule. A large majority of
the litigants said court-annexed arbitration was a good way to re-
solve cases similar to theirs and that their arbitration awards were
fair. More than 60% of the litigants said they saved time by hearing
their cases before an arbitrator, and nearly 45% said they paid a
smaller sum in attorney's fees because their cases were subject to
court-annexed arbitration."9 Only a few litigants questioned the le-
gitimacy of a process that requires their case to be heard first by an
arbitrator rather than by a judge. 0 The results of the survey also
indicate that attorneys involved in court-annexed arbitration are sat-
isfied with the process. Eighty percent of the attorneys thought that
arbitration was an efficient way to resolve their cases and 86%
thought the process was a fair way to resolve their cases. Most attor-
neys indicated that their arbitrators understood the procedural, fac-
tual, and legal issues in their cases. Three-quarters of the attorneys
said the results they received from the arbitration hearing were simi-
lar to what they had expected to receive at trial. Attorneys in cases
which were referred to court-annexed arbitration, but which were
settled before a hearing, also expressed their satisfaction with court-
annexed arbitration, and also indicated that the arbitration process
contributed to the early resolution of their cases.
B. Methodology
We surveyed litigants61 and attorneys from cases subject to arbi-
58. See, e.g., Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Cf Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
59. See infra notes123-38 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the survey
results on time and attorney's fees.
60. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
61. The authors obtained the names of the litigants from court records. Because the
records did not always contain the litigants' addresses or telephone numbers, this information
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tration in three Oregon arbitration programs: the Lane, Linn-Ben-
ton, and Multnomah County arbitration programs.6 We attempted
to survey63 litigants in every case 64 for which there had been a hear-
ing and award in the Lane and Linn-Benton programs." Because of
the large number of cases involved in Multnomah County, we did
not attempt to survey each of these cases in that jurisdiction. Instead,
we randomly selected plaintiffs from 15% of the cases in which there
had been both a hearing and an award, and we made a separate,
random selection of defendants from an additional 15% of these
cases.
66
was solicited from the attorneys of record. Letters seeking the addresses and telephone numbers
of clients to 410 attorneys were mailed.
A large percentage of the attorneys responded, although a number refused to provide the
information without their clients' prior approval. A somewhat smaller number of attorneys
refused to provide the information under any circumstances. Several attorneys were of the
opinion that they would violate the attorney-client privilege by divulging their clients' ad-
dresses and telephone numbers. Some of the information the attorneys provided was no longer
current, thus only about two-thirds of the parties for whom the attorneys provided informa-
tion. The results are reported below:
Table 1
Case Type/ Letters Responses Surveys
Category sent received completed
Lane County 80 56 25
Linn-Benton 85 49 24
Multnomah 245 109 107
Totals 410 214 156
62. The litigants were selected only from cases in which there had been both an arbitra-
tion hearing and an award. Litigants from cases subject to arbitration that had terminated
without an arbitration hearing were not surveyed because they would be less reliable infor-
mants about the effect that court-annexed arbitration had on their cases.
63. The litigants were surveyed by telephone, using law students as questioners. The
surveys required between fifteen minutes and one-half hour to complete, depending upon the
amount detail the litigants provided to the open-ended questions.
64. An attempt was made to survey both a plaintiff and a defendant from every case
from the Lane and Linn-Benton programs with a hearing and award. In cases in which there
was more than one plaintiff or defendant, only one of the multiple parties was randomly
selected to survey. Within this constraint, an attempt was made to survey at least two parties
from each of the Lane and Linn-Benton cases that met the criteria.
65. All cases from the Lane and Linn-Benton arbitration programs from the dates the
programs began and April 1, 1986 were surveyed. The Lane County program began in May,
1985; the Linn-Benton program began October, 1984.
66. The participants were selected from Multnomah County arbitration cases that ter-
minated between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1985. We sought to ensure that the
sample of Multnomah County litigants was representative by controlling the selections by case
type.
We did not attempt to match plaintiffs and defendants from the same cases because we
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We surveyed two groups of attorneys. One group consisted of
attorneys in cases that were referred to court-annexed arbitration
and in which an arbitration hearing was held. We sought to survey
attorneys from each case referred to arbitration in the Lane and
Linn-Benton programs.? Because of the large number of cases
which had gone to hearings in Multnomah County, we randomly
selected the plaintiffs' attorneys from 15% of the cases that had gone
to hearings and also made a separate random selection of defendant's
attorneys from 15% of the cases that had gone to hearings. 8
The second group of attorneys were involved in cases that were
referred to court-annexed arbitration, but which had been settled
before a hearing was held. We surveyed this group of attorneys sepa-
rately to determine whether they believed that arbitration contrib-
uted to the settlement of their cases. We followed the methodology
outlined in the preceding paragraph in selecting these attorneys.
1. Litigants and Their Cases
Of the 156 litigants surveyed," 107 were involved in the Mult-
nomah County program, twenty-five in the Lane County program,
and twenty-four in the Linn-Benton arbitration program. Our sam-
ple was balanced between plaintiffs (51%) and defendants (49%).
Eighteen litigants (11.6%) had more than one of their cases referred
were interested in the litigants' evaluation of their arbitration experience, not in obtaining
comparative responses.
67. The survey was conducted by mail. A survey was mailed to one plaintiff's attorney
and one defendant's attorney in each case that went to an arbitration hearing during the study
period. If case information reflected that more than one attorney represented either plaintiffs
or defendants in a given case, only one of these attorneys was randomly surveyed.
68. The random selections were controlled by case type to ensure a representative cross-
section of cases. No effort was made to match the attorneys that we surveyed and the cases in
which they were involved with the litigants or arbitrators that we surveyed. This practice
parallels the procedure we followed in surveying litigants from the Multnomah County cases
we surveyed. See supra note 66.
69. The sample suffered from a dual level of non-response. Some attorneys failed to
provide addresses, thereby excluding their clients from the sample. In addition, some respon-
dents refused to participate in the survey. However, on all available measures the sample
appears to be non-biased and representative of the litigant population. This suggests that the
non-response was probably random and should not effect our ability to generalize to the liti-
gant population. Confidence intervals for the data range from ± .05 to ± .07 (90% confidence
level). For instance, with our data on the litigants opinion of the fairness of the award, we can
say with 90% certainty that the true percent of litigants in the population who feel that the
award was fair is found somewhere between 56.6% and 68.6% (62.6%, ± 6%). Yet, even the
low end of the interval would support our conclusion that a good majority of litigants find the
process fair. Although this is a broader confidence interval than we would have liked, in most
instances it does not effect our overall conclusions.
1988]
556 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
to arbitration.70 Sixty-six (44%) said they had prior experience with
court trials as parties in other cases. Twenty-five (16%) said they
had prior experience with court trials in a capacity other than as a
party. The remaining sixty-five (40%) said they had no prior experi-
ence with court trials.
The distribution of cases by case type in the litigant survey was
consistent with the distribution of cases by case type in the general
population of all cases subject to arbitration during the time period
of the study.71 The largest percentage of cases were those involving
contracts, while the smallest percentage were domestic relations
cases. The distribution of cases in the litigant survey did contain a
slightly larger percentage of contract cases and a slightly lower per-
centage of domestic relations cases than were in our empirical sur-
vey. The differences were not sufficient to affect the validity of the
70. The number of responses may not total 156 in every instance because not all respon-
dents answered every question.
71. Case Type Distribution: Litigant Survey
Table 2
Case Type Number in Survey Percent by Category
Torts (non-auto) 32 20.5%
Torts (auto) 21 13.5%
Contract 84 53.8%
Domestic Relations 17 10.9%
Other 2 1.3%
Totals 156 100.0%
The distribution by case type of the 684 closed arbitration cases that terminated between
January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1985 in Multnomah County was as follows:
Table 3
Case Type Number in Survey Percent by Category
Torts (non-auto) 123 18%
Torts (auto) 96 14%
Contract 342 50%
Domestic Relations 96 14%
Other 27 4%
Totals 684 100%
With one exception, which relates to a peculiarity of the Linn-Benton arbitration rules,
the distribution of cases in the Lane and Linn-Benton programs was similar to the distribution
of cases in Multnomah County. The Linn-Benton program does not transfer domestic relations
cases to arbitration; therefore, the percentage of cases in each of the other four categories is
slightly greater than the percentages reported above.
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litigant survey.7
Thirty-five litigants (23%) said the arbitration award was ap-
pealed from in their cases, and ten (6.3%) said a trial de novo took
place. These percentages are somewhat lower than the percentages
from the empirical survey, 73 and the percentages reported by the re-
sponding attorneys in our survey.74 Of the thirty-four cases in which
the award was appealed, the litigants we surveyed appealed the
award in one-half of the cases.
2. The Attorneys and Their Cases
We received 154 surveys from attorneys who represented clients
in cases in which an award was rendered .7  Fifty-five percent of the
surveyed cases were from Multnomah County, 24% from Linn-Ben-
ton, and 21.4% from Lane County. The attorneys were an exper-
ienced group of Oregon practitioners.16 One-third had been in prac-
72. The consistency among the litigant survey, the attorney survey, and the empirical
survey on crucial descriptive information strongly supports the conclusion that our samples are
representative of the population and that any bias due to non-response is probably random and
does not effect our ability to generalize from the samples. See supra note 69.
73. The percentage of both the cases in which the award was appealed and which pro-
ceeded to trial de novo are somewhat lower than the percentages for the same events that we
found in our survey of 1,484 closed cases subject to arbitration during the period of our study.
Those figures are reported below.
Table 4
Category Number Percentage
Cases transferred to Abitration 1,484 (100%)
Cases to Hearing (with award) 744 (50%)
Cases Appealing Award 209 (28%)
(as a percentage of cases with an award)
Cases to Trial
As a percent of all cases transferred to arbitration 66 (4.4%)
As a percent of all cases with an award 66 (8.9%)
As a percent of all cases appealing award 66 (31.6%)
74. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
75. We had initially planned to use a mail survey for both litigants and attorneys. How-
ever, since the response rate of litigants to a pilot study was disappointing, we chose to conduct
a telephone survey of litigants. Therefore, when we compare the results of the litigant survey
with the attorney surveys, it should be kept in mind that the difference in methodologies may
have some hidden effect on such a comparison. The comparisons we make, however, are few,
and are primarily concerned with descriptive information. Nevertheless, the comparisons pro-
duce a surprisingly high degree of agreement among the surveys. This indicates that the slight
difference in data gathering methodology is likely not a serious problem.
76. The distribution of lawyer respondents in our survey by number of years in practice
and by number of lawyers in office is similar to the distribution found among 2,815 private
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tice for between eleven and twenty years, a third for between six and
ten years, and one-fifth" for five years or less. Fifty-seven percent of
the respondents indicated they had substantial trial experience, while
37% stated they had some trial experience. Seventy-nine percent of
the respondents had represented clients in other cases that had been
referred to court-annexed arbitration and 87.5% percent of this
group had been involved in at least one other case which had gone to
an arbitration hearing.7 Thirty-nine percent of the respondents had
served as an arbitrator in at least one arbitration proceeding.
Eighty-four surveys were received from attorneys who repre-
sented plaintiffs, and sixty-nine from attorneys who represented de-
fendants." Forty-seven attorneys reported that the arbitration award
was appealed in their case. In twenty-three of those cases the attor-
practitioners responding to a survey conducted by the Committee on Economics of the Oregon
State Bar. See The State Bar Economic Survey; Earnings and Overhead in 1985, THE PROF-
ITABLE LAW. (Oregon State Bar, Spring 1987).
77. A third of the respondents who indicated how their practice was organized were sole
practitioners. An equal percentage were in firms of not more than five attorneys and 21% were
in firms of 6 to 15 attorneys.
78. Each questionnaire sent to an attorney identified a particular case in which the
attorney had represented a client. It asked the attorney to answer the questionnaire with refer-
ence to that particular case. We asked the attorney to identify the nature of the case.
The distribution of cases by case type was as follows:
Table 5
Case Type Number of Cases
by Category by Category Percent of Cases
Torts (non-auto) 19 11.3%
Torts (auto) 33 19.6%
Contract 60 35.7%
Real Property 5 3.0%
Domestic Relations 20 11.9%
Other 31 18.5%
Totals 168* 100.0%
* The total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents because of answers
indicating more than one type of claim in the same case.
Although the distribution of case types differs somewhat from that found in our empirical
study of all cases going to court-annexed arbitration, the differences do not undermine our
ability to make comparisons. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The attorney survey
sample has a higher proportion of cases identified as "other" and a smaller proportion of
contract and tort/non-auto than the empirical study of all cases. This results in part, we be-
lieve, from the attorneys' greater tendency to classify claims as "other." For example, several
attorneys classified fraud claims as "other" while we classified such claims as tort/non-auto in
the empirical study.
79. One survey did not indicate whether the attorney represented a plaintiff or a
defendant.
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ney's client appealed the case; in twenty-four, the other party
appealed.80
The second group consisted of 105 attorneys of record who were
involved in cases transferred to arbitration in the Multnomah, Lane,
and Linn-Benton arbitration programs, but which were settled
before an arbitration hearing took place. Twenty-eight percent of the
attorneys in this group said they had practiced law between six and
ten years, while 40% had practiced law between eleven and twenty
years. A large majority said they had substantial trial experience.
The distribution of cases by type of case was similar to the distribu-
tion of cases by type of case in the general population of cases.8" Of
these attorneys, thirty-two represented clients in cases subject to the
Linn-Benton arbitration rules, thirty-six represented clients in cases
in Lane County, and the balance represented clients in the Multno-
mah County arbitration program. The attorneys were evenly divided
between those who represented a plaintiff/petitioner (49%) and
those who represented a defendant/respondent (51%). Virtually all
of the attorneys were in private practice.
IV. THE PARTICIPANTS' RESPONSES: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY
AND GENERAL EFFECTS OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
PROGRAMS
In this Part of the article we report the views expressed by the
surveyed litigants and attorneys. The first section presents the re-
spondents' perceptions of court-annexed arbitration as a "legitimate"
procedure for dispute resolution. The second section reports the re-
spondents' perceptions of the adequacy of court-annexed arbitration
procedures for the "efficient" resolution of disputes. The third sec-
tion reports the respondents' general evaluations of their arbitration
experience.
A. Legitimacy
In order to survey the participants' attitudes toward the legiti-
macy of Oregon's court-annexed arbitration program, we questioned
the participants in two areas. First, we asked whether the litigants
found their particular arbitration awards acceptable. Second, we
asked them whether they had confidence in the arbitration process
80. The appeal rate in the attorney survey is comparable to the appeal rate found for all
cases sent to an arbitration hearing in the three counties during the time of the study. See
supra note 73.
81. See supra notes 71 and 78.
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itself-i.e., the procedures leading up to the award.
1. Were Awards Acceptable to the Litigants?
a. Trial De Novo
One measure indicating the acceptability of arbitration awards
is the trial de novo rate in arbitration programs.82 However, while a
high trial de novo rate suggests widespread dissatisfaction with the
arbitration award, the opposite conclusion is not necessarily true.
Parties may accept the arbitration award for reasons unrelated to
their evaluation of the award's acceptability.8"
Our litigant survey found that in cases in which an arbitration
award was rendered, the litigants accepted the award 77% of the
time. Moreover, although the arbitration award was appealed in
23% of the cases surveyed, a trial de novo occurred in only 6.4% of
the cases. While the 6.4% trial de novo figure is comparable to the
percentage of cases proceeding to trial in the general population of
cases, and hence may not appear to represent a significant savings in
judicial time, it must be remembered that the 6.4% figure represents
the percentage of cases for which an arbitration award was rendered
which then proceeded to trial de novo. Because about one-half of the
cases subject to arbitration terminate before a hearing and award,
the trial rate for all cases subject to arbitration is less than 4%. This
figure is lower than the trial rate for all cases in the general
population.
Out of the 143 cases in the attorney survey for which the attor-
neys provided information, the parties accepted the award in approx-
imately 70% of the cases. In an additional 17.5% of the cases, the
case was appealed, but the case was settled before a trial de novo. A
trial was held and a judgment entered by the court in 9.1% of the
cases surveyed. These percentages are comparable to the respective
percentages found in the population of all cases referred to arbitra-
tion for which an award was rendered during the period of our
study." Although this figure is higher than that reported by the liti-
gants we surveyed, it is still lower than the trial rate of all civil and
domestic relations cases.
82. The appeal rate is a misleading figure. Parties may appeal the arbitration award for
any number of reasons, many of which are strategic. A high percentage of appeals does not
necessarily indicate that an arbitration program is unsuccessful.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
84. See supra note 73.
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b. Factors Leading to an Acceptance of the Arbitration
Award
Litigants may accept an arbitration award for reasons unrelated
to their perception of the correctness of the award. An arbitration
program that makes the appeal process unattractive by imposing
large fees on parties seeking to appeal the award or threatening the
imposition of large economic sanctions if the appeal is unsuccessful,
can discourage meritorious awards8" and keep the appeal rate artifi-
cially low. Therefore, in addition to the frequency with which the
litigants accepted their arbitration awards, we also inquired into the
factors that were responsible for this high rate of acceptance.
When we specifically asked the litigants what factor caused
them to accept the arbitration award, more than 43% said they ac-
cepted the award because they were satisfied with it. A number of
litigants said they accepted the award because of the prospect of in-
curring additional attorney's fees (26%), the time involved (10%), or
because they did not expect to be able to improve their position at
trial (8%). Only six litigants (4%) identified the $150 appeals fee as
the reason they did not appeal.
We received similar explanations from the attorneys represent-
ing those clients who accepted the arbitration award. The most fre-
quently provided response was that their clients were satisfied with
the outcome. Eighty-five 6 attorneys gave this response and seventy-
seven indicated that it was the primary reason. Twenty-eight attor-
neys indicated that the prospect of additional attorney's fees was a
factor in their clients' decisions not to appeal, and eighteen stated
this was the primary reason. Eleven attorneys responded that their
clients' primary reason for not appealing was their belief that they
could not have won at trial. This was cited as an additional reason,
although not the most important reason, by another five attorneys.
Only seven attorneys listed the $150 appeal fee as the most im-
portant reason for their client's acceptance of the award. An addi-
tional ten attorneys believed it was a factor, although not the pri-
mary one. It appears from both the litigants' and the attorneys'
responses that the $150 fee, by itself, was not a major disincentive to
appeal. The $150 fee is not the only monetary disincentive to appeal,
85. Most arbitration programs do impose various types of financial disincentive on a
party who appeals but fails to improve her position at trial. See supra notes 16-18 and accom-
panying text. The disincentives set out in the Oregon arbitration statute are relatively minor.
See supra notes 50-56.
86. We report numbers rather than percents for this question because the attorneys
were encouraged to select more than one response to this question.
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however. Such factors as increased attorney fees and court costs also
deter appeals.8 7 Several of the attorneys' narrative comments indi-
cated that they did not appeal because the increased costs of a trial
would have been greater than any reasonably expected improvement
over the arbitrator's award.
c. The Litigants' Evaluation of the Arbitration Award
We asked both the litigants and the attorneys to indicate the
factors which lead the litigants to accept their arbitration awards.
We questioned the litigants on the fairness of their particular award;
the attorneys were asked whether they believed court-annexed arbi-
tration was generally a fair way to resolve their clients' cases. We
limited the litigants' question to the fairness of their award because
we assumed that many of them did not have any prior experience
against which to evaluate the overall fairness of the process. We
asked the attorneys the more general question because it was as-
sumed that they had greater experience with the litigation process.
We asked the litigants two specific questions about the award:
whether they had held any expectations about the type of award they
would receive,88 and whether the award they did receive was the
award they had expected. 8' We also asked the litigants whether they
were satisfied with the award and whether they believed their award
was fair. The questions were designed to elicit different assessments
87. See J. ADLER, D. HENSLER, & C. NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS
FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 50-54 (1983).
88. Through these questions we correlated the litigants' evaluation of their awards with
their pre-hearing expectations about the award. We asked the litigants two related questions.
Question 3. "Before the arbitration hearing, what did you think your chances were of
getting a decision that you would be satisfied with?" The response frequency for Question 3 is
as follows:
Table 6
Response Number Percentage
Almost Certain 60 38.7%
Better than 50/50 36 23.2%
50/50 26 16.8%
Worse than 50/50 8 5.2%
Almost no change 9 5.8%
No expectation 16 10.3%
Total 155 100.0%
89. Question 4: !'Was the arbitrator's decision the same as or different from the decision
you expected?" The response frequency for Question 4 is as follows:
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of the arbitration award. In asking the litigants whether they were
satisfied with their award, we forced them to focus solely upon
whether the award had met their expectations. By asking whether
they believed their award was fair, we invited them to evaluate the
outcomes of their cases in more than simple "win/loss" terms.
The litigants were nearly evenly divided between those satisfied
and those dissatisfied with their awards. A slight majority (52%) said
they were either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with the
arbitration award. 90 The balance said they were either "somewhat
dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with their award." Although only
a slight majority of the litigants said they were satisfied with their
award, nearly two-thirds (62%) said their award was either "very
fair" or "somewhat fair.""
The fact that two-thirds of the respondents believed the arbitra-
tion process produced a fair award, when many said they were dis-
Table 7
Response Number Percentage
Same as what I expected 62 40.0%
Different than what I expected 83 53.5%
No expectation 10 6.5%
Total 155 100.0%
90. Confidence interval ranges from 45% to 59% (90% confidence level).
91. The response frequency for Question 5 is as follows:
Table 8
Response Number Percentage
Very satisfied 56 36.1%
Somewhat satisfied 25 16.1%
Somewhat dissatisfied 25 16.1%
Very dissatisfied 49 31.6%
Total 155 99.9%
92. The response frequency for Question 6 is as follows:
Table 9
Response Number Percentage
Very fair 60 38.7%
Somewhat fair 37 23.9%
Somewhat unfair 25 16.1%
Very unfair 33 21.3%
Total 1 55 100.0%/
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appointed with their award, indicates that the litigants differentiated
between their satisfaction with their award and their overall assess-
ment of the fairness of their award." The litigants' answers display
an interesting dynamic which may say more about the inherent opti-
mism of the human spirit than the litigation process. More than 61%
of the litigants said that before the hearing, they believed they had a
better than even chance of obtaining an award with which they
would be satisfied, and of this 61%, the largest group (38.7%) was
"almost certain" that it would be satisfied with the awards. The an-
swers do not reveal why such a large percentage of the litigants be-
lieved they would be satisfied with their arbitration awards. One can
only speculate that the litigants believed in the "correctness" of their
position and assumed the arbitrator would be similarly convinced.
Or, perhaps, their attorneys instilled a sense of confidence in the out-
come that was not borne out by the award. In any event, while more
than 61% said they had a better than even chance of receiving an
award with which they would be satisfied, only 40% said the award
they received was similar to the award they expected.
The receipt of an award that is lower than that anticipated by
the litigant tended to affect the litigants' satisfaction with the award.
The data indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship
between the litigants' satisfaction with the arbitration award and the
litigants expectations. The data also supports the conclusion that liti-
gants have a general perception that the arbitration process is a fair
way to resolve disputes, regardless of personal outcome. Some critics
93. (x=71, df=6, p < .001). Chi-square (x') is an appropriate measure for compar-
ing two variables when the data is expressed as a frequency or a percent. It examines the
difference between observed frequencies and the frequencies expected if the two variables are
unrelated to each other. A large difference between the observed frequencies and the expected
frequencies would indicate that the two variables are in fact related to each other and that the
answers of respondents to one question is linked to their answers to the other question. In this
case, the high value of x' is an indication that the respondents' satisfaction with the award is
related to their judgement that the award was similar to or different from what they expected.
The first number x"-- refers to the chi-square value. A larger value generally means
that our observed frequencies deviate significantly from what we would expect if no relation-
ship existed between the two variables. The second number df= - refers to the degree of
freedom in the analysis. A larger degree of freedom indicates that both variables have a larger
number of categories of response (e.g., strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disa-
gree v. yes and no) and influences the ease with which statistical significance may be gained.
(A larger degree of freedom will require a greater chi-square value to get the same level of
significance). The third number, p < __ , refers to the probability of getting a chi-square
value of this size and with this degree of freedom by chance when no real relationship exists
between the two variables. For example, a value of p < .001 indicates that the probability of
getting this result by chance when no real relationship exists is less than (<) one in one
thousand.
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of arbitration have contended that it produces a form of second class
justice for the litigants." Although this research was not designed to
evaluate the quality of justice provided by the arbitration programs,
it does demonstrate that litigants do not have any widespread percep-
tion that the process is unfair."
The results reported in the preceding paragraphs suggest two
important conclusions: First, most litigants perceived the arbitration
award and process as fair, even when they received an award with
which they were not satisfied. The litigants' perceptions of fairness
are a strong endorsement of the arbitration process. Second, disap-
pointed expectations are, nonetheless, an important source of dissat-
isfaction with the award. Attorneys should be aware of their clients'
attitudes and should play a role in encouraging and developing real-
istic expectations.
The litigants with prior litigation experience were more likely
than were those without prior litigation experience to believe that
their arbitration awards were fair. More than 69% of the litigants
with prior litigation experience thought their awards were either
very fair or somewhat fair, while less than 57% of the litigants with-
out prior litigation experience believed their awards were fair."
Similarly, litigants with prior litigation experience were more likely
to believe that their arbitrator accurately understood what happened
in their case (80%), than were the other litigants (70.1%).",
The attorneys also stated their general belief that the arbitration
process is fair. More than 87% of the attorneys said the process
proved to be fair in their cases. This finding tends to refute the criti-
cism that the arbitration process results in second-class justice."
This level of support for the fairness of court-annexed arbitration is
94. See supra note 58.
95. The litigants were asked what expectations they had before the hearing that they
would receive an arbitration award with which they would be satisfied, and whether the award
was the same as or different from the award they had expected. No attempt was made to draw
a correlation between a litigant's satisfaction with the award and the amount of money the
litigant received or was required to pay.
96. (x'=3, df=l, p < .09).
97. The litigants' prior litigation experience does not appear to influence their answers
to the questions whether they believed they saved time or paid less in attorney's fees, or
whether they were satisfied with their award. The distribution of litigants answering those
questions is the same for those with or without prior litigation experience.
98. There was a substantial relationship between the attorneys' belief that the court-
annexed arbitration process was a fair way to resolve their case and their belief that the pro-
cess was efficient. 90.5 % of those attorneys who thought that the process was fair also thought
that it was efficient. 89.5 % of those attorneys who thought that the process was not a fair way
to resolve their case also thought that it was not efficient.
19881
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
particularly impressive since the attorney respondents are well versed
in traditional trials and would be quick to point out unfairness in the
arbitration process.
Our survey also sought to determine the relationship between
an attorney's perception that the arbitration process is fair and the
degree to which that process mimicked the traditional trial process.
We anticipated that attorneys would be more likely to believe the
arbitration process to be fair if the result they received was similar to
that which they would have expected had they opted for a trial in-
stead.99 To test this we asked the attorneys whether the result they
received was similar or dissimilar to the result they would have ex-
pected had they proceeded to trial. Three quarters of the respondents
answered that the arbitration decisions were similar to the decisions
they would have expected at trial. A comparison of these responses
with the attorneys' views on the fairness of arbitration confirmed the
relationship we anticipated. Those attorneys who received decisions
similar to the results they would have expected from a trial were
more likely to believe the arbitration process was fair.1"'
We anticipated that there would be a correlation between the
clients' acceptance of an award and the attorneys' response that the
process was fair in their case. We expected that the clients would be
more likely to accept the award if the attorneys thought the process
was fair. This relationship did exist. More than three quarters of
those attorneys who responded that the process was fair in their
cases also said their clients accepted the award. Only 42.1% of those
who stated that the process was unfair in their case reported that
their clients nevertheless accepted their award.
2. Did Participants Have Confidence in the Arbitration
Process?
In addition to the need for the general acceptance of awards
among litigants and attorneys, a "legitimate" court-annexed arbitra-
tion program also requires that those who are subject to the arbitra-
tion rules have confidence that the arbitration process is itself likely
to produce acceptable awards. Because the arbitrator is the focal
point of the arbitration process, we asked both the litigants and the
attorneys to evaluate their arbitrators' performances and abilities.
99. The authors' hypothesis assumes that the lawyers would expect to receive a "fair"
result from a trial of their case.
100. (x'-14, df-l, p < .001).
101. (x'-13, df=3, p < .01).
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The participants' responses indicated that both litigants and attor-
neys were satisfied with their arbitrators and the procedures that
lead to the arbitration award.
a. Arbitrator Understands the Facts
We asked the litigants whether they believed the arbitrator un-
derstood the facts of their case. We asked this question because we
believed that the arbitrator's accurate understanding of the case af-
fects the litigants' perception of the "legitimacy" of the entire arbi-
tration process. If the arbitrator's function is to act as a surrogate for
a trial court, a necessary condition for the success of the process is
the arbitrator's ability to perform those judicial functions
competently.
The largest percentage of litigants said the arbitrator under-
stood the facts in their case either "very well" (49.6%) or "somewhat
well" (24.8%). Only 25.5% said the arbitrator did not understand
the particular facts in their case. The data also indicate that the
stronger the litigant believed that the arbitrator accurately under-
stood their facts, the more likely the litigants were to be satisfied
with the arbitration award.10 2 Of the 102 litigants who said the arbi-
trator understood the facts in their case either "very accurately" or
"somewhat accurately," nearly two-thirds also said they were either
"very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with their arbitration
award. We found a similar correlation between the litigants' belief
that the arbitrator accurately understood the case and their belief
that the award was fair.' 03
b. Arbitrator Concern
We next asked whether the arbitrator appeared to be concerned
with understanding the litigants' side of the case. We assumed that
arbitrators who appeared concerned would make the process appear
less impersonal and make the litigants believe they were an integral
part of the process. Forty-three percent of the litigants believed the
arbitrator in their case was very concerned and 34% believed that the
arbitrator was somewhat concerned.
Litigants who said the arbitrators were concerned with under-
standing the litigant's side of the case were much more likely to be
satisfied with the arbitration award than were those litigants who
102. (x'=87, df-9, p < .001).
103. (x'=81, df=9, p < .001).
19881
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
said the arbitrators were not concerned."" More than 84% of the
litigants who said the arbitrators were very concerned that they un-
derstand their side of the case said they were either very satisfied or
somewhat satisfied with the arbitration award. This compares with
the less than 10% of the litigants who said the arbitrators were not
concerned that they understand the litigant's side of the case and
who were nevertheless satisfied with the award.
Similarly, of the 106 litigants who said the arbitrator was con-
cerned that she fully understand the litigants' side of the case, sev-
enty-one (66.9%) were either very or somewhat satisfied with their
award. Conversely, of the thirty-one litigants who said the arbitrator
was not concerned that she fully understand the litigants' side of the
case, less than 10% were even "somewhat" satisfied with their
award. The litigants' perceptions that the arbitrator was concerned
are also related to their belief that their award was fair.'05 More
than 93% of the litigants who said that the arbitrators were "very
concerned" that they understand the litigant's side of the case be-
lieved their award was either "very fair" or "somewhat fair," while
less than a quarter of the litigants who believed the arbitrators were
"somewhat unconcerned" believed their award to be fair. None of
the litigants who said the arbitrators appeared "very unconcerned"
believed their awards were fair.
The responses from the attorneys reinforce the answers of the
litigants. A very large majority of the attorneys believed their arbi-
trators understood both the facts and the applicable law in their
cases. More than 75% of the attorneys believed the arbitrators un-
derstood the law well; 18.1% said the arbitrator understood some of
the law; and only 3.4% said the arbitrator did not understand the
law at all. Approximately 85% stated that the arbitrator understood
the facts of the case well; 12.8% said the arbitrator understood some
of the facts; and 2% said the arbitrator did not understand the facts
at all. The attorneys' evaluations of their arbitrators' understandings
represent a strong endorsement of a key element of the arbitration
process by a group that would be expected to be its most perceptive
critics.
c. Arbitration Rules Do Not Disadvantage Client
Interests
There are a number of differences between the legal rules and
104. (x'-70, df=9, p < .001).
105. (x'=70, df=9, p < .001).
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procedures of court-annexed arbitration and court trials. If attorneys
believe these differences prejudice the interests of their clients, they
will not regard court-annexed arbitration as a legitimate process.
The data strongly indicate, however, that the attorneys do not find
the differences between court-annexed arbitration and trial practice
to be unfair to their clients.
It is generally asserted that one feature associated with the in-
formality of the arbitration process is the less than rigorous applica-
tion of the formal rules of evidence. The attorney survey indicates
that this assertion is accurate: arbitrators do apply the rules of evi-
dence more leniently. Ninety-eight of the attorneys (68%) believed
that the arbitrators applied the rules of evidence less strictly than a
judge would have, and only three attorneys (2%) believed that the
arbitrators applied the evidence rules more strictly in their case than
a judge would have. More than 92.8% of the attorneys stated that
the arbitrator's evidentiary rulings did not affect the outcome of their
cases.1 6 This finding is particularly significant since it indicates that
the application of the rules of evidence in arbitration hearings does
not affect the outcomes of cases, even though the majority of attor-
neys believe they would have encountered a stricter application at
trial.
Our survey also investigated the effect of court-annexed arbitra-
tion on discovery. During the period studied, Lane County did not
refer eligible cases to arbitration until the parties had completed dis-
covery and filed a Certificate of Readiness for trial.10 7 In the Mult-
nomah and Linn-Benton programs, cases were referred to arbitra-
tion as soon as all the parties had appeared and before discovery had
begun. 08 In these two programs, the arbitrator controls discovery
and the arbitration rules require that discovery be completed within
the time limits set for holding the arbitration hearing.1 09 In the
Multnomah and Linn-Benton programs, where discovery is on an
expedited schedule in arbitration cases, the arbitrator may limit dis-
covery under the arbitration rules in ways that are not permitted a
trial judge under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure. For example,
106. As would be expected, those attorneys who answered that the arbitrators eviden-
tiary ruling had affected the result in their case were much less likely to think that arbitration
was a fair way to resolve their case than were those attorneys who answered that the arbitra-
tor's evidentiary rulings did not affect their case's outcome. Only five of ten respondents who
felt that the rulings affected the outcome also felt that the arbitration process had been fair.
107. Simoni, supra note 3, at 271.
108. Simoni, supra note 3, at 270.
109. Simoni, supra note 3, at 272. MULTNOMAH COUNTY ARBITRATION RULE 14.14.
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in contrast to Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 36, the arbitration
rules authorize the arbitrator to consider the nature and complexity
of the case and the amount in controversy in deciding whether to
limit discovery. 10 The hypothesis has developed that these discovery
rules might decrease the efficiency of the arbitration process. That is,
if the period for discovery is too short, or if arbitrators place limita-
tions on discovery which the attorneys believe to be too strict, then
the efficiency of arbitration might be lost since attorneys might re-
quest a trial de novo to ensure adequate discovery.
Our data does not support this hypothesis. We asked whether
the arbitrator imposed discovery restrictions. No attorney reported
the application of any restrictions on discovery. Therefore, arbitrator
control of discovery was not a factor affecting the trial de novo rate.
Furthermore, our data also demonstrate that the short time lines es-
tablished under the arbitration rules did not contribute to the trial de
novo rate because 97.4% of the attorneys said the arbitration rules
provided enough time to prepare the case properly before the arbi-
tration hearing.
B. Efficiency
1. Case Complexity
Many proponents of court-annexed arbitration believe it works
most efficiently with cases that are not complex. If this is correct,
and only less complex cases are referred to arbitration, then the rate
of appeal to trial de novo should be low. To the extent such appeals
are minimized, the arbitration process will be efficient.
The attorneys we sampled believed their cases were not com-
plex. Three questions in the survey asked whether the procedural,
legal, and factual issues involved in the case were "very," "some-
what," or "not complex." Most respondents characterized the issues
in their cases as not very complex on any of the issues. More attor-
neys found a higher degree of factual complexity in their cases than
legal or procedural complexity. Only 2.1% found their cases to be
procedurally complex. 11
110. Simoni, supra note 3, at 272-74. MULTNOMAH COUNTY ARBITRATION RULE
14.14 directs that in ruling on a discovery motion the arbitrator is to "consider the nature and
complexity of the case, the amount in controversy and the possibility of unfair surprise which
may result if discovery is restricted." This provision is similar to the 1983 amendments to FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(iii). The Federal Rules changes have not been incorporated in the Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure.
111. Case Complexity:
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We hypothesized that there would be an inverse relationship
between the degree of complexity and the degree to which an attor-
ney believed arbitration to be an efficient method of resolving his or
her case. Although we hoped to examine this relationship, the very
small number of complex cases in our sample made this analysis
difficult. The data did indicate a modest relationship between proce-
dural complexity and the attorneys' perceptions of arbitration effi-
ciency. Those attorneys who stated that their cases were not proce-
durally complex were also more likely to answer that arbitration was
an efficient way to handle their case than those who said their case
was somewhat procedurally complex."'
2. Attorneys and Discovery
One of the arguments in support of court-annexed arbitration is
that it is efficient."" If arbitration can resolve a case more quickly
and at less cost and result in an award that is accepted by the par-
ties, then the process will substantially reduce the delay otherwise
present on the trial docket. We examined the extent to which the
attorneys' opinions agreed with this proposition.
In general, the attorneys found that the arbitration process was
efficient in their cases. When asked the question, "Do you believe
that court-annexed arbitration was an efficient way to resolve this
case?," eighty percent of the attorneys responded "yes." The propor-
tion of attorneys answering "yes" was consistent for each type of
case, with two exceptions. First, attorneys who were questioned
about contract cases were more likely to answer that the process was
efficient (87.9%). We speculate that this may be due to the nature of
contract actions. Such actions are often more dependent upon docu-
mentary proof than are tort actions, and the measure of contract
damages is often simple to ascertain. Second, attorneys who were
asked about dissolution cases were less likely to answer that the pro-
cess was efficient (63.2%). Some attorneys suggested in narrative
Table 10
Type of Very Somewhat Not
Complexity Complex Complex Complex Total
Procedural 3 (2.1%) 13 (9.2%) 125 (89%) 141 (100%)
Legal 7 (5.0%) 48 (34.3%) 85 (61%) 140 (100%)
Factual 12 (8.5%) 57 (40.4%) 72 (51%) 141 (100%)
112. (xt =6, df=2, p < .05).
113. See supra note 8.
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comments that special knowledge of Oregon property settlement
standards is necessary to the structuring of appropriate dissolution
awards. We speculate that the lower efficiency evaluation by attor-
neys in dissolution cases may result from the fact that arbitrators
may not have the particularized domestic relations experience neces-
sary to structure such an award.
Attorneys in cases where the arbitration award was accepted
were much more likely to regard the process as efficient (89.1%)
than were attorneys whose cases had gone through arbitration, ap-
peal, and trial de novo (30.8%)."' Our survey also found that a rela-
tionship exists between certain other factors and the attorneys' views
on the efficiency of court-annexed arbitration. These factors include
the procedural complexity of the case,1 '5 the relative amount of time
the attorney reported spending on the case, 6 the length of time
needed for resolution by arbitration relative to the delay expected
outside arbitration, 1 " the degree of savings in attorney's fees,11" and
the arbitrator's understanding of the law and facts.1 '
Supporters of court-annexed arbitration have suggested that its
expedited procedures result in attorneys undertaking less discov-
114. (x=30, df=3, p < .001).
115. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
116. Of those attorneys reporting that they spent less of their own professional time on
the case than they would have had it not been subject to arbitration, 95.5% believed that the
arbitration process was efficient. Among attorneys who reported spending as much time on the
case as they would have without arbitration, 75% stated that the process was efficient. Only
31.6% of attorneys who reported that they spent more time because of arbitration stated that
the process was efficient. (x=5, df=2, p < .001).
117. The relationships between the attorneys' responses to the question of what effect
court-annexed arbitration had on the time needed to resolve their case and those responses to
the question about efficiency were similar to responses described in the preceding footnote.
Attorneys who believed that arbitration shortened the total period of time needed to dispose of
the case were much more likely to believe that it was efficient. (x29, df=2, p < .001).
118. It was anticipated that attorneys who believed that their client paid less in attor-
ney's fees because of arbitration would be more likely to believe that arbitration was efficient
than would be those attorneys who believed that their client paid more fees because of arbitra-
tion. As expected, attorneys who believed that their clients paid less in attorney's fees because
of arbitration were more likely to believe that the arbitration processcwas efficient. Of those
reporting that their clients paid less in attorney's fees because of arbitration, 98.5% thought
that the process was efficient; of those answering that there was no difference in fees, 73.7%
felt arbitration was efficient; and of those answering that their client paid more in attorney's
fees because of arbitration, only 27.8% thought that the process was efficient in their case.
(x=47, df3, p < .001).
119. Those attorneys who thought that the arbitrator understood the law (x=7, df=2,
p < .03) and those who thought that the arbitrator understood the facts (x'-7, df=2, p <
.03) were much more likely to believe that the process was efficient than the attorneys who did
not think that the arbitrator understood either factor.
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cry. 120 This in turn might contribute to the efficiency of court-an-
nexed arbitration. However, 69.6% of the attorneys with cases that
had gone to an arbitration hearing reported that they spent as much
time in discovery in their case as they would have had the case not
been referred to arbitration. Only 28.4% reported that they spent less
time in discovery than they would'have had the case not been re-
ferred to arbitration. Two percent reported that they spent more
time in discovery. Many of the attorneys who indicated that they
spent as much time in discovery commented that they did so because
they prepared the case as if it were going to trial. Several attorneys
indicated that their cases involved disputes that were so simple that
there was no need for discovery.121 Those attorneys who spent less
time on discovery were much more likely to respond that court-an-
nexed arbitration was an efficient method of resolving their case."2
3. Saves Time and Attorney Fees
One assumption behind court-annexed arbitration is that non-
complex cases can be handled effectively with simplified and expe-
dited procedures. Another assumption is that a successful program
will provide a more efficient disposition of cases subject to arbitra-
tion, saving the litigants both time and money.
These are difficult assumptions to either prove or disprove. No
two cases are precisely the same and an assortment of non-quantifi-
able factors can affect both the amount of time necessary for disposi-
tion of a case and the amount of attorney's fees litigants must pay. In
the absence of a control group of similar cases not subject to arbitra-
tion, s2 one cannot objectively determine whether litigants save time
and attorney's fees by having their cases referred to arbitration.
However, our survey was able to measure the litigants' perceptions
of the amount of time and money saved, and these perceptions pro-
vide some measure of the efficiency of the arbitration programs.
a. Litigants
We asked the litigants whether they believed they "saved time
having their case heard by an arbitrator rather than in court by a
judge." Sixty-two percent of the litigants said they believed they
120. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
121. The attorneys in the survey overwhelmingly characterized their cases as not being
procedurally, legally, or factually complex.
122. (x'=16, df=2, p < .001).
123. See generally LIND & SHAPARD, supra note 25, at 18-19.
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saved time. Twenty-four percent said they did not save time; the re-
mainder were uncertain of the effect arbitration had on the time nec-
essary to resolve their case. These results are similar to the responses
of the attorneys, a majority of whom also answered that their clients
saved time by having their case resolved by an arbitrator." 4
When we asked the litigants whether they believed they "paid a
smaller or larger sum in attorney's fees because of court-annexed
arbitration," 44% said they believed they paid less in attorney's
fees,125 13% said they paid more in attorney's fees, 17% said they
paid the same amount in attorney's fees, and 25% said they were
uncertain of the effect arbitration had on their attorney's fees. 2
Again, we found that the litigants and the attorneys were consistent
in their evaluation of the effect court-annexed arbitration had on at-
torney's fees. 27
The difference between the percentage of litigants who said
they saved time (62%) and those who said they paid a smaller sum
in attorney's fees (44%) appears anomalous because of the assumed
relationship between the length of time necessary to terminate a case
and the amount of attorney's fees a litigant pays. This apparent
anomaly can be explained by the fact that an arbitration hearing had
taken place in each of the cases surveyed. In comparison, only 5.4%
of all civil cases filed in circuit court in the three judicial districts1"8
proceeded to trial. The large percentage of cases proceeding to hear-
ing can be explained by the arbitration program's scheduling re-
quirements. 29 Because the arbitration rules require the hearing to
124. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
125. Confidence intervals ranged from ± 05% to ± 07%.
126. When the litigants' answers to the questions about time and attorney's fees were
correlated with their answers about how their cases terminated, it was determined that liti-
gants in cases in which the award was not appealed or in which there was no trial de novo
were much more likely to answer that they saved time and attorney's fees than were litigants
in other cases.
127. The response frequency is as follows:
Table 11
Response Litigants Attorneys
Litigant paid a smaller sum in attorney fees 44% 45%
Litigant paid a larger sum in attorney fees 13% 12%
No difference in the attorney fees 17% 40%
Uncertain 25% 3%
128. This figure includes cases subject to arbitration which proceeded to trial de novo as
well as cases exempted from arbitration.
129. See LIND & SHAPARD, supra note 25.
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take place approximately seven weeks after the case has been trans-
ferred to arbitration and an arbitrator appointed, " ' the quick sched-
uling of the hearing may not give the cases enough time to mature
for fruitful settlement discussions to take place. Thus, the quick
scheduling of the hearing may promote a speedy resolution of the
case at the expense of requiring attorneys to present their clients'
cases at arbitration hearings. The hearing process apparently gener-
ates additional attorney's fees because the attorneys view the arbitra-
tion hearing as an analogue to trial and prepare for it in the same
manner that they prepare for trial. " 1
By a large percentage, the attorneys we surveyed said they pre-
pared as much for an arbitration hearing as they would have for a
trial. More than two-thirds of the attorneys said they conducted as
much discovery before the hearing as they would have for a trial, " 2
and 66% said they prepared for the hearing in the same manner they
would have prepared for a trial."' Because the arbitration hearing
occurs more frequently in arbitration cases than does a trial in cases
not subject to arbitration, and because many of the attorneys pre-
pared for the hearing in much the same manner they would have
prepared for trial, it is not surprising to find that the percentage of
litigants who believed they paid less in attorney's fees is smaller than
the percentage who believed that their cases were resolved more
quickly because they were subject to arbitration.
The data also demonstrate, however, that in some instances ar-
bitration is inefficient because it imposes an additional procedural
requirement on litigants whose cases end up being tried in court. If a
large percentage of arbitration cases were to routinely proceed to
trial, there would be little reason to recommend court-annexed arbi-
tration. Trial de novo, however, is not a common occurrence among
cases subject to arbitration, and the effectiveness of the arbitration
process must be judged by the way it handles the typical cases, not
the atypical ones.
b. Attorneys
We asked the attorneys if they spent more or less of their own
professional time on their case than they would have had it not been
subject to arbitration. Forty-six percent of the attorneys reported that
130. See Simoni, supra note 3, at 270 n.161.
131. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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they spent less time on the case, 40% reported that they spent as
much time, and only 14% reported that they spent more time on the
case.
18 4
When asked what effect court-annexed arbitration had on the
overall time needed to resolve the case, 49.7%'11 reported that it
would have taken more time to resolve the case had it not been sub-
ject to arbitration, 8 " 28.6% reported that it would have taken the
same amount of time, and 21.8% reported that it would have taken
less time to resolve the case had it not been subject to arbitration.
The survey asked attorneys whether they believed their clients
paid smaller or larger attorney's fees because of court-annexed arbi-
tration. While 45% believed their clients paid a smaller attorney's
fee, 40% believed there was no difference in the sum their client
paid, 12% believed their clients paid more in attorney's fees as a
result of arbitration and 3% were uncertain. Our finding that only
45% of the respondents stated their clients paid less in attorney's fees
is not particularly surprising because a majority of the respondents
answered that they conducted discovery and prepared for arbitration
in the same manner they would have for a trial. 8 The attorneys'
evaluations of the effect court-annexed arbitration had on attorney's
fees are similar to those of the litigants.18
4. Comfort Level for the Litigants
Court-annexed arbitration does not mirror a traditional trial in
all respects. As we have seen, the rules of evidence are often relaxed.
There are many other differences between the two processes, and
these differences may affect the litigants' satisfaction with arbitra-
tion. We attempted to gain some sense of the importance of these
factors by asking the litigants several open-ended questions.
134. Note that the confidence interval here is ± 07. (90% confidence level). This means
that we are 90% confident that the percentage of attorneys in the population who felt that they
spent less time on the case is no lower than 39% and no higher than 53% (46% ± 07%). We
are 90% confident that the percentage of attorneys in the population who feel they spent the
same amount of time ranges from 33% to 47%. Therefore, we are fairly secure in suggesting
that most attorneys in the population feel they spent less time or at least no greater amount of
time on an arbitration case as other cases.
135. Confidence interval would range from 43% to 57%.
136. Confidence interval is ± 7% (90% confidence level).
137. The attorneys' response that they spent as much time on discovery and prepared
for the hearing in the same way as if the case had not been subject to court-annexed arbitra-
tion is perhaps explained by the attorneys' observations that these cases were not complex.
They would have engaged in little discovery in these simple cases in any event. See supra notes
120-21 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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Most of the litigants appeared to be satisfied with the way in
which the arbitration hearing had taken place. Their narrative an-
swers to the question "[w]hat, if anything, did you like about the
hearing" indicate that the largest number of litigants answering this
question focused on the "environment" of the hearing. Forty-one
percent of the litigants said they were pleased with the relaxed, non-
threatening nature of the hearing, as well as its "business-like" at-
mosphere. Seventeen litigants stressed the arbitrators' competency,
while twenty-one liked the brevity of the hearing.
We also asked the litigants "[w]hat, if anything, didn't you like
about the hearing?" Five litigants said they believed their hearings
were too informal, while twenty-one expressed varying degrees of
dissatisfaction with the arbitrator. A number of litigants disapproved
of the hearing's setting in the arbitrators' offices rather than in the
court house. One litigant was dissatisfied with the physical proximity
of the other party.
In this section, we demonstrated that many perceptions of liti-
gants and attorneys in court-annexed arbitration support the as-
sumptions that led to its development. Most litigants and attorneys
believed that their cases were resolved more quickly and informally
through arbitration.
C. Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration by the Litigants
One question in the survey asked the litigants to provide their
general evaluation of court-annexed arbitration. We asked them
whether, based "on your experience with court-annexed arbitration,
do you believe it is a good way to resolve cases like yours?" Eighty
percent of the litigants said arbitration would be a good way to re-
solve cases like theirs. This strong response makes two statements
about arbitration. First, and most obviously, it is an endorsement of
court-annexed arbitration by those most directly affected by it. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more importantly, it establishes that litigants ap-
prove of court-annexed arbitration whether or not they are satisfied
with their own arbitration awards.
Of course, litigants who are satisfied with their arbitration
awards are more likely to say that arbitration would be a good way
to resolve cases like theirs than were dissatisfied litigants.'3 9 More
than 96% of the litigants who were either "very satisfied" or "some-
what satisfied" with their arbitration awards said that arbitration
139. (x'=30, df-3, p < .001).
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would be a good way to resolve cases like theirs. But, a large per-
centage of the litigants who were not satisfied with their awards still
believed that arbitration would be a good way to resolve cases like
theirs. Of the sixty-one litigants who were not satisfied with their
arbitration awards, nearly three-quarters of them still believed that
arbitration would be a good way to resolve cases like theirs.
Nearly 95% of the litigants who thought their arbitration
awards were fair also thought that arbitration would be a good way
of resolving cases like theirs.140 More than 56% of the litigants who
did not think their awards were fair still believed arbitration would
be a good way to resolve cases like theirs.
The answers to this general question also indicate that the liti-
gants had few concerns about the "legitimacy" of court-annexed ar-
bitration. The vast majority of the litigants surveyed did not express
significant concerns about the "legitimacy" of the arbitration process
as a dispute resolution mechanism. In fact, only one litigant said he
wanted "to get the arbitration hearing over with so that I could go
on to a court trial." The lack of additional similar responses indi-
cates that the litigants viewed the arbitration process in the same
way that they would have viewed a trial; that is, as a legitimate
method of resolving legal disputes.
We found a relationship between the litigants' prior experience
as a party and their evaluation of the arbitration award. The data
reveal that 88.1% of the litigants with prior litigation experience be-
lieved that court-annexed arbitration would be a good way to resolve
cases like theirs, whereas only 77.1% of the litigants without prior
litigation experience held this belief. Thus, litigants with prior trial
experience tended to evaluate court-annexed arbitration more favora-
bly than did inexperienced litigants.
In many ways, the responses of those with prior experience re-
present a more informed evaluation of court-annexed arbitration be-
cause they do not evaluate court-annexed arbitration against an ab-
stract yardstick, but rather against their experience with traditional
litigation processes. For these reasons, the litigants who had prior
experience were uniquely qualified to evaluate court-annexed
arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
The court-annexed arbitration program in Oregon is a success
140. (x"=38, df-3, p < .001).
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in the eyes of its primary consumers-the litigants and attorneys
who use the system. Our survey of attorney and litigant participants
in three Oregon judicial districts indicates that they do not believe
they were relegated to a system of second-class justice. Rather, a ma-
jority of the respondents indicated that court-annexed arbitration is
legitimate, efficient, and fair.
Of the litigants we surveyed in cases in which an award was
entered, 77% accepted the arbitrator's award. In those cases in the
attorney survey, the parties accepted the award more than 70% of
the time. Nearly two-thirds of the litigants believed their awards
were either "very fair" or "somewhat fair." Even among those liti-
gants who were not satisfied with their arbitration awards, most be-
lieved that both the process and the awards were fair. Litigants with
prior litigation experience were especially likely to believe that their
arbitration awards were fair.
More than 87% of the attorneys surveyed believed the arbitra-
tion process to be fair. In addition, three-quarters of the attorneys
believed their clients' arbitration awards were similar to the judg-
ments they would have expected to receive at trial.
Litigants and attorneys alike were satisfied with both the arbi-
trator's performance and with the procedures that led to the arbitra-
tion awards. Both groups believed the arbitrators understood the
facts in their cases. Further, the attorneys did not find the differences
between court-annexed arbitration and court trial to be prejudicial to
their clients.
Court-annexed arbitration is also viewed by the participants as
an efficient way to settle disputes. Eighty-percent of the attorneys
believed the system was an efficient way to resolve their cases. A
majority of both the litigants and the attorneys agreed that the liti-
gants saved time by having their cases heard before an arbitrator.
However, only a minority of the respondents believed they saved at-
torney's fees. We conclude that this result may be explained by the
fact that the attorneys generally prepared for arbitration in the same
manner that they would have prepared for trial, and that they spent
as much time in discovery.
Finally, 80% of the litigants stated that court-annexed arbitra-
tion was a good method for resolving their case. This response pro-
vides strong support for the legitimacy of the arbitration process.
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